Abstract-Advanced automation is involved in information collection and evaluation, in decision-making and in the implementation of chosen actions. In such systems, human responsibility becomes equivocal, and there may exist a responsibility gap. Understanding human responsibility is particularly important when systems can harm people, as with autonomous vehicles or, most notably, with Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS). Using Information Theory, we develop a responsibility quantification (ResQu) model of human interaction in automated systems and demonstrate its applications on decisions involving AWS. The analysis reveals that human comparative responsibility is often low, even when major functions are allocated to the human. Thus, broadly stated policies of keeping humans in the loop and having meaningful human control are misleading and cannot truly direct decisions on how to involve humans in advanced automation. Our responsibility model can guide system design decisions and can aid policy and legal decisions regarding human responsibility in highly automated systems.
Index Terms-Analytical models, autonomous systems, decision making, human-computer interaction (HCI), human-automation interaction, information theory, responsibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
DVANCED automation and autonomous systems have become ubiquitous. Financial markets largely function through algorithmic trading mechanisms [1, 2] , semiconductor manufacturing is almost entirely automated [3] , and decision support systems and aids for diagnostic interpretation have become part of medical practice [4, 5] . Similarly, in aviation, flight management systems control almost all parts of the flight [6, 7] , and in surface transportation, public transportation is increasingly automated, and the first autonomous cars appear on public roads [8, 9] . In these systems, computers and human share the execution of different functions, such as the collection and evaluation of information, decision-making and actions implementation.
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As the systems become more advanced, the human comparative responsibility becomes equivocal. For instance, what is a human's responsibility when all information about an event arrives through a system that collects and analyzes data from multiple sources, without the human having access to any independent source of information? If the human receives an indication that a certain action is needed, and accordingly performs the action, should the human be held responsible for the outcome of the action if it causes harm?
Human responsibility is particularly important when system actions can possibly harm people, as may be the case with autonomous vehicles. It becomes crucial when such harm is certain, as with autonomous weapon systems (AWS), deliberately designed to inflict lethal force.
So far, the subject of human responsibility was investigated from philosophical, ethical and legal perspectives, but it has received less attention in the literature on cognitive engineering of human-automation interaction. This prompts for the development of a quantitative model of human responsibility. To answer this need, we set out to develop the analytical Responsibility Quantification (ResQu) model, that enables us to compute human responsibility in an interaction with automation. We will demonstrate its application on the example of advanced weapon systems (AWS), because the issue raises particular public concerns in this context. However, the model is applicable wherever automation plays a major role in a process.
A. Human Involvement and Responsibility
Philosophical research has dealt extensively with the concept of responsibility, investigating its different facets, namely role responsibility, causal responsibility, moral responsibility and liability responsibility [10] [11] [12] . When discussing human interaction with automation, role responsibility relates to the process of function allocation, which assigns specific roles and duties to the operator and to the automation. However, this role assignment does not specify the causal relationship between the operator's actions and different consequences and outcomes. This relation is better defined by causal responsibility, which describes the actual contribution of human involvement to system outcomes.
So far, causal responsibility was usually associated with people -a person or an organization was seen as more or less responsible for a particular event. When an event involved technology, the responsibility was usually with the user, unless some unforeseeable circumstances caused some unexpected outcome. Manufacturers of systems could also be held The field changed with the introduction of automation, defined as the system performing parts or all of a task that was or could have been performed by humans [13] . The ability to control a system and the resulting consequences is a necessary condition for assigning responsibility [14] . However, humans may no longer be able to control advanced automation sufficiently to be rightly considered responsible. As the level of automation increases, the human role shifts toward shared control, in which the human and automation jointly make decisions or control actions, which are combined to generate a final control action or decision, or supervisory control, in which the human sets high-level goals, monitors the system and only intervenes if necessary [15] . Moreover, in advanced systems, which incorporate artificial intelligence and machine-learning, developers and users may be unable to fully control or predict all possible behaviors and outcomes.
Consequently, humans' responsibility in highly automated systems becomes equivocal and cannot be separated from the causal contribution of the system's configuration and reliability. The automated system itself (or its developers) may be perceived as sharing some of the responsibility [16, 17] . This understanding resembles the legal concept of comparative responsibility, a doctrine of tort law that divides fault among different parties [18] [19] [20] .
To conclude, the rapid developments in technology create an inevitable responsibility gap in the ability to divide causal responsibility between human automation. This gap cannot be bridged using traditional concepts of responsibility [21] [22] [23] .
B. Human involvement in Advanced weapon systems (AWS)
AWS perform different functions associated with the selection and engagement of enemy targets. The rapid developments in AWS have raised concerns that with increasingly intelligent and autonomous military technologies, humans will become less and less involved in their use and less responsible for lethal outcomes [22, [24] [25] [26] . These concerns prompted extensive philosophical, ethical, and legal debates, which elicited demands to restrict and regulate the development of advanced AWS or even ban their use altogether [14, [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] .
Governments respond to these worries with the assurance and demands that a human will be kept in the loop, whenever advanced automated systems exert lethal force [24] . The explicit policy of the U.S. Department of Defense is that "Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force" [35] . In addition, under U.S. policy, supervised autonomous weapon systems may select and engage targets only in local defensive operations such as protecting land-bases and ships, and fully autonomous weapon systems are limited to application of non-lethal, non-kinetic force [35] . The UK policy is that the operation of weapon systems will always be under human control, and that no offensive systems are to have the capability to prosecute targets without involving a human [36] . The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and other organizations promote the need for meaningful human control of AWS [37] . This approach aims to ensure that commanders and operators will have enough information to make conscious decisions, and can intervene if necessary, and that AWS should be designed to facilitate such meaningful control [38] .
C. Meaningful human involvement
The demand to involve humans in automated processes and facilitating meaningful human control is not unique to AWS [39] . However, simply putting a human into the loop does not assure that the human will have a meaningful role in the process. There may be cases when the human cannot knowledgably supervise the automation, or when the human has to make decisions, based exclusively on input from automated functions that one cannot evaluate independently [40] .
System designers often keep humans in the loop to cope with unexpected events, even when the human may be unable to cope with such events. In this case, humans may function as "moral crumple zones", being the ones to carry moral and legal responsibility when the system fails [41, 42] .
Currently, there are different, and sometimes contradicting interpretations and policies regarding meaningful human involvement. System designers lack models and metrics needed for systematically addressing the issue of meaningful human control [43] . Our responsibility quantification (ResQu) model aims to address these needs, based on the premise that meaningful human involvement requires the human to have some causal responsibility for the outcomes.
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY QUANTIFICATION MODEL (RESQU)
A. A model of information flow in a human-automation system According to Parasuraman et al. [13] , a combined humanautomation system performs a sequence of four consecutive information processing functions: the acquisition of information, the analysis of that information, the decision what action to take, based on the information, and the implementation of the action. Each of the four functions can be automated at some level, from the lowest level of fully manual performance to the highest level of fully automatic performance.
A model developed by Conant [44] uses n-dimensional Information Theory to analyze the information flow in realworld systems, composed of interacting parts and subsystems. The system acquires input from its environment, and it generates output to the environment. Each variable in the system is a message source, which sends information about its values to other variables. Thereby, the functioning of the system, which is usually formulated as a process of causes, effects, and activities, becomes a network of transmitters, channels, and receivers. With this representation, one can quantify the information flow, causal relations, and statistical dependence between variables and subsystems in terms of Entropy and Mutual Information (also called Transmission).
We integrated Parasuraman et al.'s and Conant's models and created a general model of information flow in a combined human-automation system. This flow model will serve as the basis for human responsibility quantification as a function of available information and system design, including selected automation levels and function allocation.
B. Notation
The System: Assume a system that consists of two subsystems: an automated module and a human user. Although the terms "system" and "automation" usually carry similar connotations, in the present study the term system refers to the overall system, containing both the human and the automated module subsystems, and it indicates their combined performance. The terms "human" and "automated module" refer to the subsystems and to their specific performance and parameters.
Environment states: The system operates in an environment that can be in one of N possible states (N≥2). Each of the N states can be characterized by m different observable and measurable variables Ei (i=1...m). Different states have different, but partially overlapping, distributions on each of the values of Ei (i=1...m). Thus, when observing specific realization of Ei (i=1...m), the current environment state remains uncertain.
Information acquisition: The first stage deals with the acquisition and registration of multiple sources of information. Let Yi, and Xi (i=1...m) denote, respectively, the acquired values of Ei (i=1...m) by the automated module and the human. Due to measurement and accuracy limitations of the sensors, the measurements Yi and Xi (i=1...m) may add uncertainty (or internal noise) to the actual observed value Ei, (i=1...m). In addition, not all the m state-characteristic variables are observable by the human or the automated module. When a certain state characteristic variable Ei is not observable by the human, Xi will not contain any information about Ei (and the same for Yi, when Ei is not observable by the automated module).
Information analysis phase: The second stage deals with manipulation of the acquired information, in order to infer the current environment state, as a base for action selection. Let Ya and Xa, denote, respectively, N dimension vectors, generated by the automated module and human subsystems, that assign posterior probabilities to each of the possible N environment states, based on the acquired information by each subsystem Yi, and Xi (i=1...m). Depending on the system's automation level and function allocation, the results of one subsystem's information analysis or action selection may serve as an additional source of information for the other subsystem's information analysis.
Action selection phase: In the third stage, decisions are made and actions are selected, based on the results of the information analysis. Let Ys and Xs denote, respectively, variables of the automated module and the human that correspond to the selection of a preferred action amongst a set of finite action alternatives. For the automated module, Ys is uniquely defined by the automated module's algorithm, once all input variables Yi, (i=1...m) are acquired, and the analysis algorithms Ya is executed. For the human, Xs is based on the results of the human information analysis Xa, and it depends on characteristics of the human utility function, which relates costs and benefits to different outcomes that may be generated by each action alternative.
Action implementation phase: The fourth and final stage involves the implementation of the selected action. Let Z denote the implemented action. We assume that the implemented action Z only depends on the actions selected by the automation and the human, Ys and Xs , and on the relative amount of human versus automatic impact on generating a response. Dictated by system's configuration and automation level, Z may be entirely determined by the human action selection, by the automatic module in some autonomous systems, or by a combination of the two. In systems that incorporate adaptive automation (dynamic function allocation), the determination of Z may vary according to the identified environment state. This may be the case, for example, in systems where automation can override human actions when it identifies a critical emergency that is beyond human response capabilities, such as automatic emergency breaking systems in cars. Fig. 1 presents a schematic depiction of system variables and information flow, in the integrated model. The general information flow model presented above portrays possible system variables and information flows in a human-automation system. However, in actual systems some of the variables and information flow routes do not exist. For example, many decision support systems (DSS) perform only the analysis function, and they present the results of the analysis to the human for decision making and action selection. In such systems, the internal information flow is only from the automated module subsystem to the human subsystem, and the output of the system Z depends only on the human action selection. Fig. 2 presents such a case. The ResQu model can be similarly applied to analyze the information flow in other types of systems, having various levels of automation and types of human control, such as shared control or supervisory control. 
C. Defining Responsibility measures
We measure human responsibility by quantifying the unique comparative share of the human in determining the distribution of the system output Z (the implemented action). We do so by computing the proportion of the output distribution that cannot be a result from automation, and thus represents the level of exclusive human contribution. Using Information Theory [45, 46] we define the comparative human responsibility for the system's output Z as
where H(X) is Shannon's entropy, which is a measure of uncertainty related to a discrete random variable X, defined as:
and H(X/Y) is the conditional entropy, which is a measure of the uncertainty remaining about a variable X when a variable Y is known:
The conditional entropy in the numerator of Resp(Z), ( / 1 … , , ) computes the uncertainty remaining about Z (the overall system output), when the results of the automation's information acquisition, information analysis and action selection are known. In our model, this remaining uncertainty may be attributed only to human subsystem variables. Thus, the ratio of the conditional entropy and the full entropy of Z quantifies the unique comparative human contribution in determining the distribution of the system's output Z.
The use of Shannon's entropy averages the comparative human contribution over all possible states in the environment, their distribution on the set of measurable parameters, and the resultant distributions of human and automation parameters, which are all known a priori.
By definition,
This occurs if, and only if, the system's output variable Z is independent from the automation variables. In that case, all the uncertainty about Z is completely determined by the human, and thus the human is fully responsible for the system output. Resp(Z)=0 iff ( / 1 … , , ) = 0. This happens if, and only if 1 … , , completely determine Z without any unique contribution of the human variables. Numbers between 0 and 1 represent the level of unique human contribution to the overall output (i.e. level of meaningful human involvement), given the automation performance.
Our responsibility measure is closely related to Theil's uncertainty coefficient, U(X/Y), which is a measure of association between two variables X and Y [47, 48] . Theil's uncertainty coefficient computes the relative reduction in the uncertainty of a variable X due to the knowledge of another variable Y:
where I(X:Y) is the mutual information between X and Y. Theil's uncertainty coefficient is more general than the notion of staistical correlation, since it can be used to measure complex associations that do not have to be linear, and also associations between nominal variables. It has values between zero and one. It equals zero iff the variables are statistically independent and share no mutual information, and equals one iff knowledge about the value of Y enables one to predict the value of X.
Theil's uncertainty coefficient and our responsibility measure complement each other, and their sum is 1. This is clear, as the association between automation's processes and the system output Z increases, the remaining unique contribution of the human decreases.
III. APPLICATION OF THE RESQU MODEL TO AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS (AWS)

A. General
We applied the ResQu model to the analysis of a representative generic AWS. We assume that the system detects targets automatically, but it requires some level of human involvement during the engagement process, either in the loop or on the loop. This is the typical structure of an AWS that complies with current U.S. and UK policies. Such an AWS alerts its operators upon detection of targets and engagements. It actually can be perceived as a type of an alert system, a simple and widely studied form of automation in flight decks, industrial control rooms, vehicles, and medical equipment [7, [49] [50] [51] .
We used the assumptions and formulation of Signal Detection Theory (SDT) [52] [53] [54] , to model the probabilistic nature of the representative AWS and the environment in which it operates (see the Appendix for a more detailed description).
B. Information flow model for AWS
Assume that an AWS operates in an environment with only two types of entities: targets, which should be engaged, and noise, which are entities that resemble targets, but which should not be engaged. Engagement of noise entities leads to undesired costs, such as waste of expensive or limited ammunition on false targets or collateral damage. The relative frequency of targets in the environment is Pt, and the relative frequency of noise is 1-Pt.
The overall operational goal of the AWS is to detect, identify and engage targets, while avoiding the engagement of noise. To do so, the system automatically scans specific designated areas (e.g., specific geographic regions or air sectors) for the presence of entities. We assume that the system detects all entities in its vicinity with certainty. Hence, the main challenge for the AWS is the classification of each detected entity as target or noise. The classification of entities relies on the combined performance of two subsystems -a human operator and an automated module.
Target and noise entities have characteristics that are to some extent discernible to human senses or physical sensors (e.g., optical, thermal electromagnetic and acoustic signature, mobility characteristics, etc.). In our example, we assume that the human operator and the automatic module each observe a value e for each entity based on these characteristics. The distributions of e for target and noise entities are Gaussian with equal variance and different means, allowing some discrimination between the two types of entities. However, the distributions overlap, so there is uncertainty whether an observed entity is a target or noise. In terms of Signal Detection Theory, we assume that the human operator and the automated module each have detection sensitivities (d'Human and d'Automation), defining their respective capabilities to distinguish between target and noise entities. The human and the automation may also differ in the threshold value above which they classify an entity as a target (with response criteria βHuman and βAutomation).
The automated module conducts an independent binary classification process, with Y denoting its classification result (target or noise). This may be a correct target classification (True Positive), or an incorrect target classification (False Positive) when noise is falsely classified as a target. It also includes True Negatives, when noise is classified as noise, and False Negatives, when a target is falsely classified as noise.
We assume that the engagement process itself is mostly automatic, but it requires some level of human involvement, whether in the loop or on the loop. In human in the loop control, we assume that whenever the automation classifies an entity as a target, the engagement process proceeds only if the human decides to engage and actively authorizes the engagement. The engagement halts if the human decides to abort and remains passive (does not authorize the engagement). In human on the loop control, we assume that whenever the automation classifies an entity as a target, the engagement proceeds automatically, as long as the human remains passive, and halts only if the human takes an active action to abort it. In addition, in both types of control, the human can always decide to engage an entity, even if the automation classified it as noise. Thus, in both cases the human has to decide whether to engage or to abort. The only actual difference is whether an active action is required to implement the chosen action, or whether the human can remain passive. The human action selection is denoted by X, and can be either engage or abort.
If the human chooses to engage an entity, the system conducts the rest of the engagement process (e.g., missile lock on target and missile firing) without the need for human intervention. The outcome of the integrated system is denoted by Z. This outcome represents whether an entity detected was eventually engaged or not. It is important to note that in both types of human control, humans have the final word and can always override and alter the automated module's recommendation, based on their own information analysis and action selection processes. Thus, in the portrayed system, Z is strictly determined by the results of the human action selection process. Fig. 3 depicts the above description of system structure and information flow, in a typical AWS that includes human involvement, either in the loop or on the loop 
C. Defining responsibility measures for AWS
The information flow and system structure, shown in Fig.3 , enable us to simplify the general formula for Resp(Z), to:
Now, the system output Z is determined exclusively by the human action selection X (see Fig. 3 ), so we have:
Although the human action selection fully determines the system's output, this selection depends to some extent on the information from the automated module, as would be the case in most decision support systems. Since, Resp(Z)= Resp(X), it is sufficient to compute the human responsibility for action selection X. To do so, we need to compute the entropy H(Y) of the automated module classification variable, the entropy H(X) of the human action selection variable, and their joint entropy H(X,Y).
We first compute the distribution of Y and its entropy. Using the general SDT formulas, given in the appendix, with d'Automation and βAutomation we can compute the automated module's expected rates of True Positive (TP), False Negative (FN), False Positive(FP) and True Negative (TN) which will be denoted by ̃, ̃, ̃, and ̃, respectively. Using these rates and the target probability Pt, we can compute the distribution of Y, which is presented in Table I , from which the computation of the entropy of Y is straightforward.
We proceed to compute the joint distribution of X and Y, the human and automation variables. When aided by the automated module, the human uses two different response criteria according to the module's classification results (target or noise). Assuming the use of optimal response criteria, it is possible to compute the expected True Positive and False Positive rates of the human, using common SDT formulas (see details in the appendix). We will denote the human expected rates, when the module indicates that an entity is noise, by /" " , /" " , /" " , and /" " . When the module indicates that an entity is a target, we will denote the human expected rates by /" " , /" " , /" " , and /" " . The joint distribution of X and Y is presented in Table II , from which the computation of the joint entropy H(X,Y) is straightforward. Table II is the same as in Table I , because /" " + /" " = 1 and /" " + /" " = 1. From Table 2 we can also derive the marginal distribution of X (the human action selection variable), which is summarized in Table III , from which the computation of the entropy of X is straightforward. Tables I, II , and III).
Proposition 1:
The comparative human responsibility, ( ), is monotonically decreasing in d'Automation, and monotonically increasing in d'Human.
Proof: Proof is provided in the Appendix. Fig. 4 presents an example of numerical computation of human responsibility for the combined system output Z, as a function of the d'Automation and d'Human, each on a scale ranging between .6 (low ability to distinguish between target and noise) and 3 (high ability to distinguish between target and noise). The monotonic properties of Resp(Z) in d'Automation and d'Human, are evident. In this numerical example all the other influential variables are assumed fixed, and equal for both the automation and the human, with target frequency of Pt = 0.2, payoff matrix ratio of Vratio = 2/3, and βAutomation = βHuman = 2.7. We will report the results of sensitivity analyses of the effects of changes in the values of these parameters on responsibility outcomes. Proof: Proof is provided in the Appendix. Proposition 2 describes the combined effect of the automation's and human's detection sensitivities, when both associate the same payoffs with correct and incorrect actions. In this case, when the automation sensitivity is much higher than the human sensitivity (i.e. R is very large) the human responsibility for the output approaches zero. In this case, the human relies mainly on the classification made by the automated module. In contrast, when the automation sensitivity is much lower than human sensitivity (i.e. R is close to 0), the human responsibility for the output approaches 100%. Here humans rely mainly on their own classification capabilities, ignoring information from the automated module. It is important to note that even when the human sensitivity is not high, the human responsibility may still be high, as long as the automation sensitivity is much lower than that of the human (i.e. as long as R remains low). Fig. 5 presents an example of the numerical computation of human responsibility as a function of the ratio R= d'Automation/d'Human, under the same assumptions of Fig. 4. Fig.  5(a) shows that the human responsibility may converge quite fast as a function of R. When R exceeds 3, the human responsibility is very close to zero, and for R lower than 1/3, the human is almost fully responsible for the system output. When the automation sensitivity is more than double that of the human sensitivity, the human responsibility drops below 20%. Fig. 5 (a) also demonstrates that when d'Human and d'Automation are similar, and their ratio R is close to 1, the responsibility measure can have a range of values. In this case, different combinations of d'Human and d'Automation, that have the same ratio R, can lead to different responsibility values. The reason for that is evident from Fig. 5(b) that shows that when R is close to 1, different combinations of d'Human and d'Automation lay in different responsibility regions, depending on their specific values. In this case, human responsibility is higher when both d'Human and d'Automation are similarly low, compared to when both are similarly high. When both d'Human and d'Automation are equally high, the human can benefit from utilizing the additional information supplied by the automation. The decision will then be based on a similar weighting of the human's own information and the information from the automation, as both are rather accurate. The resultant human responsibility is approximately 50% (40%-60%). However, when both sensitivities are low, the low detection sensitivity of the automation cannot add much to the human decision process. Hence, humans rely mainly on their own detection capability, even if it is limited, leading to higher human responsibility for the overall outcomes. A sensitivity analysis shows that changes in the values the variables that were assumed fixed in Fig. 4 and 5 do not change the above conclusions, as long as both the human and the automation associate the same payoffs with correct and incorrect actions and relate the same initial value for targets frequency.
Matters are different when the human and the automation have considerably different payoff structures or estimates of the target frequency, leading to the use of different response criteria by the automation and the human. Fig. 6 depicts the effects of differences in response criteria on human responsibility for three selected ratios of human and automation sensitivities.
In the first case (Fig. 6a) , R=1/3, due to the higher human sensitivity, humans rely mainly on their own classification capabilities and response criterion. This leads to very high human responsibility, regardless of the specific value of the automation's response criterion βAutomation. Thus changes in βAutomation, have no effect on the overall human responsibility.
In the second case (Fig. 6b) , R=3, the human relies mainly on the automation classifications and has low responsibility. However, as is evident from the figure, the differences between the human's and the automation's response criteria affect the level of responsibility. When the human response criterion differs much from the automation response criterion (is more than 10 times larger or smaller), the human responsibility is considerably higher (increases to 40%-50%) than when they are similar (less than 10%). The human and the automation response criteria differ when the two assign different values for possible decision outcomes, such as falsely engaging noise or missed engagement of targets. If this is the case, the human relies less on the automation classification, as it reflects a different assessment of the values of desired and undesired outcomes.
In the third case ( Fig. 6c) d'Automation is somewhat higher than d'Human, and neither value is high. In this case, the effect of differences between the human and the automation's response criterion becomes more prominent. 
IV. DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that human responsibility in automated systems depends on the combined characteristics of the human, the automation, and the operational environment. Therefore, even when important system functions are allocated to the human, human operators of advanced automated systems may still not be responsible for the system actions and their outcomes.
Hence, the simplistic demand to keep a human in the loop in order to retain meaningful human control can be misleading and futile. Literally adhering to them may create a mismatch between role responsibility, the extent to which system designers assign functions to human operators, and causal comparative responsibility, i.e., the actual level of human contribution to system processes and outcomes. Simply demanding human involvement does not assure that the human will have a meaningful role, since human responsibility depends on the design of the specific system and on the operational environment.
We also show that for some system configurations, both human on the loop and human in the loop levels of control can lead to the same level of human responsibility, because the same information flow model of the combined humanautomation system represents both. Thus, the difference between these two systems is not always as substantial as commonly perceived.
So, when and how should one involve a human in highly automated systems? According to our analysis, humans only have significant comparative responsibility when they make unique contributions that supplement or exceed the automation's capabilities to perform certain functions (e.g., when the human has independent sources of information or is better able to select actions). However, as technologies develop, humans will contribute less to system processes. For instance, future AWS technologies will almost certainly exceed human performance in many critical operational tasks, such as the ability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, or the assessment of the likelihood of hitting a target or harming civilians. A human intervening in the performance of systems with such advanced capabilities may impair overall system performance, due to humans' inherent cognitive and physical limitations, such as relatively long reaction times.
With the advent of advanced automation, with abilities that clearly exceed human performance in many critical functions, a choice will have to be made. One can progress to fully autonomous systems that keep the human operator out of the loop and abandon the current prevailing demand for a system design with humans in the loop. Alternatively, one can limit the development of autonomous systems and the use of automation. The intermediate option, where systems will be increasingly intelligent while still keeping the human in the loop, will likely lead to the inclusion of humans to simply fulfill regulatory requirements without them having any real impact on system performance.
The current ethical and legal discussion regarding human involvement in automated systems should not only focus on the advantages and disadvantages of such systems, but it should also consider the implications of keeping humans in the loop, even when they have little real influence. Falsely claiming that the human is responsible for the outcomes of actions of the automated system may expose her or him to unjustified legal liability and to the psychological burden of self-blaming, even when the person actually contributed very little to the outcome.
To conclude, our ResQu model, enables responsibility quantification and provides a new quantitative tool that contributes to the understanding of human-automation interaction. This tool may aid system design decisions and guide policy and legal decisions regarding human responsibility in events involving advanced automation.
Our study is clearly only a first step in the complex task of quantifying human responsibility in highly automated systems. In particular, the ResQu model is normative and assumes perfect human rationality and full knowledge about probabilities and properties of the automation. Future work should strengthen the ground for the ResQu model, by assessing its predictive ability against actual human performance, and tie it to existing empirical research on human human-automation interaction.
V. APPENDIX
This appendix presents basic Signal Detection Theory (SDT) concepts and formulas, we used to model the probabilistic nature of the AWS and to perform the numerical calculations, leading to the results presented in the manuscript.
The most basic model of SDT describes a system with a single sensor, observing an environment with only two possible entities: Target+Noise (referred to as Target) and Noise alone (referred to as Noise) that occur with probability Pt and 1-Pt, respectively. Both entities can be measured by a single observable parameter, which transforms the data into a scale value. The distributions of values of the observed characteristics for target and noise entities differ (with targets usually assumed to have a larger mean value that noise), which allows some discrimination between the two types of entities. However, the distributions overlap so when a certain value is observed, there is uncertainty whether the entity is indeed a target or whether it is actually noise.
The sensor is required to identify and engage targets and to prevent engagement of noise. This binary decision is categorized as Engage or Abort. The responses are the outcomes of the decision process and can be categorized into four possibilities. True Positive (TP) refers to the situation where a target is presented and the response was correct to engage. False Negative (FN) refers to the situation where a target is presented and the response was incorrect not to engage. True Negative (TN) refers to the situation where a noise is presented and the response was correct not to engage. False Positive (FP) refers to the situation where a noise is presented and the response was incorrect to engage. In general, signal detection theory enables differentiation between the detection sensitivity of a single sensor to its response bias. The detection sensitivity (d') is the sensor's ability to differentiate between target and noise. This is represented by the shift of the signal probability density function, compared to the noise probability density function. When d'=0, the sensor is unable to distinguish between target and noise. As d' increases, the ability to distinguish between the two entities increases.
For every value of the observed parameter, there are two associated likelihoods: to observe that value under the distribution of target or to observe that value under the distribution of noise. We assume a threshold likelihood ratio is set, such that an observation with lower likelihood ratio would be considered as noise and not engaged, and an observation with higher likelihood ratio would be considered as signal and engaged. This threshold is called the response criterion (β). The response criterion represents the sensor's tendency to favor one response over the other. The value of the observed parameter at the threshold is called the cutoff point (C). In an analogical manner, when the value of the observed parameter is lower than the cutoff point, the observation would be considered as noise and not engaged. Similarly, when the value of the observed parameter is higher than the cutoff point, the observation would be considered as target and engaged. The values of d' and β determine the probabilities of the four possible outcomes (TP, FN, FP, and TN) as presented in Fig. A.1 . The probability for different outcomes can be calculated as:
Now, assume that there are cost-benefit values associated with each outcome: VFP VTN VFN VTP (where: VFP and VFN are negative costs, VTP and VTN are positive benefits). Then, it can be shown that the optimal response criterion, β*, which maximizes the expected value is given by:
Where Pt is the target probability and 1-Pt is the noise probability. We denote the ratio of the cost-benefit values as:
To conclude, under the above assumptions, if we know the probability of signal in the environment (Ps), the sensor's sensitivity (d'), and the ratio of the cost-benefit values (Vratio), we can use the above formulas to calculate an optimal response criterion (β*) that maximizes the expected value. We can also compute the True Positive and False Positive rates.
For the combined man-automation system, we assume that the human and the automated module have different detection sensitivities (d'Human and d'Automation), leading to different capabilities to classify whether a given entity is a legitimate target or noise. In addition, the human and the automation may also differ in the threshold value above which they classify an entity as a target (with response criteria βHuman and βAutomation, respectively).
We next examine the case where the human detection is aided by the automated module, which produces an alert when it identifies a suspected target. Assume that the automated module has detection sensitivity d'Automation and a response criterion βAutomation, which are known to the human. Denote the module's rates of True Positives classifying noise as target). Using Bayes' law, the human can use these probabilities to update the prior probability of signal in the environment, according the automation classification results.
Denote by ̂/ " " , the human posterior probability for target, when the automated module classifies an entity as target.
The human uses ̂/ " " , instead of Pt in (A9), to compute the optimal response criterion that maximizes the expected value, given that the module has classified an entity as a target.
Denote by ̂/ " " , the human posterior probability for target, when the automated module classifies an entity as noise.
In same manner, the human uses ̂/ " " in (A9) to compute the optimal response criterion that maximizes the expected value, given that the module has classified an entity as a noise.
Thus, when aided by an automated module the human uses two different response criteria or cutoff points: one is used when the automated module classifies an entity as target and the other when the automated module classifies an entity as noise. The human cutoff point when the entity was classified as target by the automation is smaller than when it was classified as noise (see Fig. A.2) . By adjusting the threshold according to the classification of the automated module, the human increases the probability of distinguishing between target and noise.
Denote by d'effective the combined sensitivity of such system. This is essentially the sensitivity equivalent to a single Gaussian SDT detector that has the same level of performance as the combined tandem man-automation system. By definition, d'effective is higher than d'Human and d'Automation.
Assume that (a) The cost and benefit values : VFP VTN VFN VTP are the same for the human and the automated module; (b) The cost and benefit values for the human are independent of the classification results of the automatic module; (c) The initial information of the human and the module, about a certain state of the world, are uncorrelated; (d) the distributions of the observed values of target and noise are normal with unity variance.
Pollack and Madans [55] have shown that under the above simplifying assumptions the maximum value of d'effective, when the detectors preserve continuous information and an optimal decision rule is employed will be equal to
In our system, there is some loss of information, since the automation provides only binary information rather than continuous, so in most cases d'effective will be lower than d'max.
Lemma 1: Resp(Z) is monotonically increasing in d'Human. Proof: Assume that d'Human increases, and all other variables remain fixed. In particular, since d'Automation remains fixed, so do the human posterior probabilities for target ̂/ " " and ̂/ " " , presented in equations (A11) and (A12). Denote by β*"T" and β*"N" respectively, the optimal human response criterions that maximizes the expected value, given that the module has classified an entity as a target or noise. These two criteria remain fixed as d'Human increases. For each of them, there is a corresponding cutoff point that can be derived using equation (A7). As d'Human increases, it follows from (A7) that the weight the human gives to the automation decreases monotonically to zero, so the two corresponding cutoff points are moving towards each other, approaching a fixed value of ½ d'Human . This means that as d'Human increases, when selecting an action, the human assigns more weight to d'Human and less weight to the automation classification results.
In terms of information theory, this means that as d'Human increases, the human action selection variable X depends less on the automation classification variable, Y. Hence their mutual information I(X:Y) decreases monotonically, H(X/Y) increases monotonically, and so does H(X/Y)/H(X). From equations (10) we can conclude that Resp(Z) is monotonically increasing in d'Human □ Lemma 2: Resp(Z) is monotonically decreasing in d'Automation Proof: Assume that d'Automation increases, and all other variables remain fixed. As d'Automation increases, both ̃ →1 and ̃ →1 monotonically.
We first examine a case where an entity is classified as a target by the automated module. In this case, the human uses ̂/ " " to compute the optimal response criterion, instead of Pt in (A9). From (A11) we get ̂/ " " →1. The increase in ̂/ " " lowers the human response criterion, and from (A7) this lowers the corresponding human cutoff point, so /" " →1. Denote by /" " the probability that the human will choose to engage an entity, given that it was classified as a target by the automation.
/" " =̂/ " " /" " + (1 −̂/ " " ) /" " (A16) From the above, when d'Automation increases, /" " monotonically increases to 1. In a similar manner, it can be shown that when d'Automation increases and an entity is classified as noise by the automation, /" " decreases monotonically to 0. Therefore, as d'Automation increases, there is a higher probability that the human will act according to the automation classification, engaging an entity that is classified as target, by the automated module, and aborting an engagement of an entity that is classified as noise.
In terms of information theory, this means that as d'Automation increases, the automation classification variable, Y, gives more information on the human action selection variable X, monotonically reducing H(X/Y), the remaining uncertainty about X when Y is known, towards zero. Denote by T a Bernoulli variable that corresponds to the prevalence of targets in the environment. As d'Automation increases the distribution of Y approaches the distribution of T so H(Y) approaches a fixed known value H(T) ∈ (0,1). In addition, as d'Automation increases, the distribution of X approaches the distribution Y, so H(X) also approaches H(T). From equations (10) Consequently →∞ ′ = ′ . This means that when both human and automation associate the same payoffs with correct and incorrect actions, and d'Automation is much larger than d'Human, a rational human will base the action selection decision primarily upon the results of the automation classification. Therefore, when R ∞ the human action selection variable, X, will be fully determined by the automation classification variable, Y, and thus will have the same distribution as Y. In terms of entropy this means The proof for R  0 is analogical. In this case, we have:
Thus, →0 ′ = ′ . This means that when d'Human is much larger than d'Automation, and both human and automation associate the same payoffs with correct and incorrect actions, rational humans will base the action selection decision primarily on their own detection capabilities. Therefore, when R 0 the human action selection variable, X, will be independent from the automation classification variable, Y. In terms of entropy this means: 
